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Cochran: Estimating as a Management Tool

ESTIMATING AS A

MANAGEMENT TOOL
Estimating in the fullest sense involves
more
than cost analysis. Rather, it should
a compre
hensive planning process, a model of company or
ganization, operations, goals under
conditions
imposed by
program being considered.
by Edward B. Cochran
Sierra Capital Company

grumbles about the
estimating profession—its prac
titioners most of all! The esti
mator says management ignores
estimates and quotes
at give
away prices. Management seems to
remember only when it bought
estimate for a major program
which promptly went down in
flames. Somebody is always un
happy. And to make matters worse,
everyone
of himself as an
expert in estimating who can do
better than those responsible.
The situation
often explained
with the old bromide that estimat
ing
art, not science. This is in
deed true of much estimating—from
estimating the cost to make or
machine a casting to that for
sembling a large missile or develop
ing
design and prototype. But
that answer begs the issue. For
what is it that makes estimating so
bothersome?
At the very outset, certain ele
ments of estimating practice hint
that much more than cost analysis
is involved:
• Cost analysis tied to the past,
but the estimate is a look at
the future.
veryone

E
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• Cost data itself depends on
operating results and policy
discussion,
ons,' sales forecasts,
and

makemake-buy policy, the volume
of other products, facilities
available.
• Cost overruns are taken as di
rect evidence of poor estimat
ing, but a fair share are due
more to poor management af
ter the job is sold.
• Costs are only a part of man
agements decision to quote or
proceed with a program.
Failure to recognize this interde
pendence of estimating with other
management arts may be the root
of our difficulty. On this basis, then,
the proper aims and scope of esti
mating will be the prime subject
of this
after we develop
specific background on typical esti
mating practice and the issues it
raises.
Two types of companies are illus
trated—others could be used, but
these two are of particular interest,
as we shall see. The estimate itself
may be either for quotation to cus
tomers or for management review
prior to approving company sup
port of a large project. Both cir

cumstances are of equal impor
tance, for either course commits
 the company to a major series of
actions during which it risks loss
of funds and misallocation of valu
able resources.

A commercial manufacturer
Chart I, page 34, outlines the
estimating procedure for a typical
commercial company. The key
steps of the estimate or data re
quired by it are listed down the left
side, and the major participating
departments across the top. The
circles indicate the functions per
formed by each department,
the flow of data and advisory rela
tionships are indicated by the lines
connecting them. The basic flow is
from Design (A) to Schedule (B)
to Price (C) to Cost (D) to Top
Management (E) which, of course,
s the decision. There is a great
deal of feedback between depart
ments on crucial aspects of the
estimate, as indicated by the lines
which connect different depart
ments crisscross fashion.
In a commercial company, selling
price and other marketing require
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business. Therefore they should be
easily monitored. Therefore, direct
ments dictate the ground rules. The
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of Planning, Systems, and Controls, given
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No.weight
1, Art. 9in a year of
no more
labor costs can be based on fixed
estimate starts with a forecast of
low volume than in one of high vol
industrial engineering standards for
sales volume and shipping prices
ume. Ordinary costing techniques
run
plus allowance for setup
based on established distribution
result in greater allocation of fixed
based on lot sizes appropriate to the
patterns. These data constitute
costs to each unit in a year of lower
product and company experience.
parameters governing not only pro
volume, and so affect the estimating
Since the change in product design
duction costs, but all phases of
process by generating a push to
and manufacturing process
mi
design, development, and produc
higher
prices at the very time when
nor, the effect of shifts in make-buy
tion planning as well.
they
are
least supportable.
relationships (more ticklish to esti
Generally, the commercial manu
mate) is slight, and the principal
facturer’s estimate involves rela
difficulty is in the impact of changetively minor changes in existing
over on the small area of scrap and
products or manufacturing proces
rework costs. Consequently, where
ses. They may seem big at the time,
sizable start-up costs are involved
but, as we shall see later, they
or a major new product introduces
usually are rather modest in scope.
high unit labor costs, the com
The objective is generally greater
fl
mercial company has much less
reliability, lighter weight, easier
timating capability, and it
often
servicing, longer life or other fac
reduced to a cautious phasing in of
tors of improved customer appeal.
small changes over a period of time.
The design engineering depart
Similar considerations apply to esti
ment’s participation in the estimate
mating material, predicated on sta
is therefore modest, limited to
ble make-buy policies and consider
One approach to this is to ignore
preparation of revised drawings
able experience by vendors on the
fixed costs entirely in making the
and specifications and conduct of
important materials. Accuracy is
price decision (see below). Another
some tests. Since development costs
high, but again the skill of estimat
is to allocate them to units each
and timetables will be minor in
ing new designs and materials is
year on a fixed “standard volume,”
relation to the total estimate, even
not developed.
a projection of average unit output
a substantial error is not too sig
Shop overhead costs frequently
for five or ten years ahead. Ob
nificant. This generates a real weak
run 25 per cent or more of the sales
viously the investment in
ness in commercial estimating
dollar. Although reporting of these
fixed costs must prove profitable
skills. When such manufacturers do
costs is traditionally the butt of
over the same cycle, or it should
face major development programs,
criticism by management analysts,
not be made. But allocation of that
they find it difficult to program the
the commercial company does a
investment to the units made each
effort accurately and so incur a dis
careful job in estimating overhead
year should be appropriate to that
proportionate risk of error, as many
on the whole. Data are computed
years volume, so as not to affect the
have learned to their sorrow.
for many burden
and there
estimating problem disproportion
is examination of variable as dis
ately. Many questions are resolved
Manufacturing problems
tinguished from fixed, cash versus
by this broader approach.
Scheduling of a new program
noncash, and sunk versus uncom
mainly relates to tooling and pro
mitted costs—though often with
Other considerations
duction change-over problems, with
wistful backward glances at less
related vendor support. Facility
sophisticated concepts. Some com
Selling and administrative expen
and tool requirements may be
panies even apply industrial engi
ses receive careful treatment in
sizable in dollars, but they are fa
neering standards to overhead ele
keeping with their size (7 to 40 per
miliar types and involve familiar re
ments, though many who say they
cent of sales). Sales promotion and
arrangement or expansion moves.
do simply rearrange crude budget
advertising alone can be sizable,
Production programing therefore
data into a “standard cost” format.
and are assigned to specific prod
simple, so that again the commer
One result of this close examina
ucts on the basis of well thought
cial company’s skills in this basic
tion is worth further comment.
out promotional plans. Warehous
management art are only partially
With reasonably good prediction of
ing and similar distribution costs
developed. This
not always rec
long-range markets, much thought
may even be subject to the same
ognized by the analysts who be
has been given by some commercial
industrial engineering analysis ap
come fascinated with the impres
manufacturers to the cyclical pric
plied to manufacturing operations.
sive mechanization of procedures.
ing effects of the distribution of
Establishment of the final selling
Much commercial manufacturing
fixed overhead. The costs of basic
price, with associated distribution
involves a high degree of machinemanufacturing organization and fa
pattern, sales terms and discounts,
controlled operations, so that labor
cilities are relatively fixed through
is dominated by Marketing. The
content is low, well-defined, and
out the ordinary fluctuations of
relation of the product’s price to
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Chart
I

NORMAL ESTIMATING PROCEDURE
Commercial Hardware Manufacturer
Manufacturing

KEY STEPS OF
THE ESTIMATE

Marketing

Design
Engineering

Industrial
Engineering

Production
Control and
Purchasing

Finance

Top
Management

Product Design

Program Schedule

Development Cost
Production Cost
Facilities & Tools

Direct Labor
Direct Material

Overhead
G&A

Profit

Sales Terms

Price

competition is a primary considera
tion for commercial business; price
comes first. Profit is determined by
what can be worked out in the cost
area to fit the general price guide
line, and a program may well be
prof
dropped if intensive “value engi
neering” results in a margin not
adequate to justify the risk. In ad
dition, some companies have moved
well into the abstractions of econ
omic analysis to determine the way
in which changes in unit price af
fect the rate of unit sales volume
(the demand curve). By measuring
how price cuts increase the rate of
sales and price increases reduce it,
and by combining this analysis with
data on variable unit cost, one can
often estimate with tolerable ac
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curacy the price at which company
it will be maximized. This price
will in turn define the rate of sales
to be expected, which itself will
establish the impact of fixed costs
and final company profit. The whole
procedure hinges on marketing
analysis, which during the past
three decades rapidly has become
more sophisticated within commer
cial companies.
Similar analysis may be applied
to promotional costs. Some com
panies have gone far in determin
ing the sales impact of a dollar’s
worth of additional advertising or
dealer contest costs, even by area
of the country. Such costs affect
both unit sales rates and variable
unit costs, but will also permit

evaluation of the company’s most
profitable combination of selling
price and promotional cost. This
certainly complicates the pricing
and estimating decision beyond the
point of simplicity comfortable to
many managements. But such ana
lytical techniques define the right
issues and force the entire estimate
to grapple with concepts actually
relevant to the business decision at
stake.
Throughout the entire estimating
process there is constant feedback
of the facts or decision at one step
upon those at others. This is stimu
lated through the constant partic
ipation of Marketing and Finance,
whose key personnel generally take
a broad view of the entire proce-
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FINANCE
manufacturer,
as
portrayed
by the
2
2
-_
3
simplicity of the flow pattern. But
6
10
more basically we shall see that
4
major problems exist in areas rarely

Design
Schedule
Cost
Price

TOTAL
4
7
25
6

Total

42

7

15

8

12

Figure

dure. The degree of interaction may
be crudely suggested by counting
the number of circles (duties per
formed) and lines (advisory rela
tionship) which connect different
departments in our flow chart:
Marketing has 36 per cent of the
activity according to this count,
with almost 30 per cent assigned to
Finance. The Finance contribution
is even higher where that depart
ment plays a key role in broad
management planning and policy
formation, as it does in many com
mercial companies. (See Figure 1,
above.)

A technical products company
During the past thirty years,
companies in certain industries
have found themselves under in
creasing pressure for rapid tech
nological advance in their products.
During that time, research and
development has advanced to such
a dominating position as to make
change a virtual way of life in such
industries as aerospace, electronics,
atomic energy and instruments. The
same thrust has also affected the
make-up of those in command of
such companies, since the emphasis
on technical accomplishment en
courages technical background for
those in key management spots.

Born of defense needs
Such industries originally ap
peared in the field of defense ori
ented products, reflecting acute
needs by the military not only to
capitalize on but also to stimulate
advances in science and engineer
ing. However, the progress of the
scientific revolution during the last
three decades has caused generally
rapid expansion of industry sharing
fruits. The strength of the trend
may be illustrated by the fact that
the number of patents issued yearly

jumped in twelve years from 32,000
to 52,000, one-fourth faster than the
national output. The number of
doctor’s degrees granted in engi
neering jumped explosively by 20
per cent a year in 1960-61. Coming
closer to industrial operations, re
search and development expendi
tures climbed almost one-fifth each
year from 1954 to 1958, and kept
right on climbing by 12 per cent
annually through 1961. These costs
alone are now 3 per cent of our
whole national output! Each of
these developments contributes to
the huge volume of business now
done by companies operating in
highly technical areas.
What is that volume? As one ap
proach, a simple tabulation of sales
volume for thirty-eight major tech
nical products companies totals
around $26 billion for 1961; adding
the R&D expenditures by other
sectors of the economy, total ac
tivity was some $35 billion. As an
other, value added by the technical
companies1 exceeds 35 per cent of
all hardgoods manufacturing;2
when R&D by other sectors is
added, total technical products ac
tivity is within a quarter of equal
ing that by all other hardgoods
manufacturing! It seems, then, that
the time is not far when the two
types of manufacturing will be
equal!
Since technical companies are so
sizable and are still increasing their
impact on the economy, appraisal
of their estimating practices should
be instructive. Chart II, page 36,
therefore illustrates them briefly.
Generally the chart shows much
less interdepartmental feedback
1 Value added for the electrical ma
chinery, instrument, and aircraft indus
tries, as reported for 1961.
2Value added for all durable goods
manufacturers, excluding basic metals
production.
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significant for the commercial
manufacturer and have required
new management tools. At the same
time, operating conditions for tech
nical products companies influ
enced them to overlook the need for
certain conventional management
practices accepted by commercial
manufacturers after long and bitter
experience.

Estimating R&D
From the nature of technical in
dustries, product performance sets
the sales pace. A revolution in de
sign creates sales, and the develop
ment cycle then governs manufac
turing. This is just the reverse of the
commercial manufacturer’s proce
dure. Time is of the essence, since
the new design can be obsoleted
overnight. Development is costly
and complex, involving close co
ordination of design, prototype
manufacture, performance test, and
final production. This complexity of
co-ordination is compounded by
extreme time-compression and the
multiplicative effect of many small
failure probabilities. Further, sub
ms are often major develop
ment tasks in themselves, and,
being performed by outside sources,
they can embody the seeds of cata
strophic failure or delay to the en
tire program.
However, one excuse used to
justify poor estimates can be re
futed: that such estimating involves
predicting the basic creative pro
cess, which is no more possible for
technical matters than for artistic
ones. Now it is certainly true that
we would not initiate a formal pro
ject to produce a painting equiva
lent to the Mona Lisa for a specified
sum of money within a given pe
riod of time. The result might be
achieved, but the probability is low
—even with “expert” personnel. But
this reasoning, while true, is irrele
vant. Even a major breakthrough in
the technical products field (such
as the V-2 missile or the atom
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ordinating
complex
development
bomb), while it demands every Cochran:
and production projects with fan
ounce of the creativity within its
tastic time-compression. The ordi
key participants, is not comparable
nary industrial engineering Gantt
to the fundamental discoveries of
chart has been exploited to such an
physics or mathematics that are the
extent that what began as a mere
true analogue to artistic creation.
difference of degree has become a
Such breakthroughs are simply an
difference in kind from all previous
elaborate engineering development
estimating techniques. These indus
of previously proven concepts and
tries and their Defense Department
theories. As such they are subject
customers have gone on to invent
to careful planning and predictable
further refinements such as network
time schedules, even though with
margins of error and an occasional
scheduling and critical path analy
total failure.
sis, which again are developments
of previous ideas to such a massive
degree as to become brand new
Production time compressed
methods. Not content with this,
they are attacking the classic eco
It is the unique contribution of
nomic problem of establishing the
the technical products industries—
relationships of cost, time, and other
especially those in the aerospace
field—to have developed effective
resources to the ultimate product
result. The day may not be far off
techniques of planning and co

when rather realistic multidimen
sional “models” of the development
cycle can be constructed for physi
cal inspection by company manage
ments and careful exploration by
their computers. Such an achieve
ment will be of
impor
tance to the entire economy, and
must be attributed to the greater
technical sophistication of the man
agements in these industries.
These major contributions to the
management art have not been
achieved without shortcomings.
The difficulties involved in such
estimating often encourage abuses,
reflecting personal and corporate
objectives. For example, there is
sometimes a lack of interest in the
accuracy of cost or time schedules.
Estimates are sometimes on the op
timistic
which certainly helps

Chart II
NORMAL ESTIMATING PROCEDURE
Engineering Products Company
Manufacturing

KEY STEPS
OF ESTIMATE

Design
Engineering

Marketing

Industrial
Engineering

Production
Control &
asing

Finance &
Contracts

Top
Management

Product Design

Program Schedule
Development Costs
Facilities & Tools



Direct Labor

Direct Material

Overhead
G&A
Profit

Sales Terms
Total Price
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Planning,
Vol.
1 [1964],
No. direct
1, Art. 9labor as well.
mating,
affects
to get the business,
butServices:
results A
inMagazine
has aofcertain
costSystems,
K, unitand
2NControls,
will
And in both labor and material
overruns “often ranging from 300 to
have a cost RK where R is a con
costs, the bad habits developed
1000 per cent,” according to an
stant ratio reflecting the degree of
through lack of rigid estimating
assistant secretary of defense. One
cost reduction from unit N to unit
integrity in Government programs
serious case: the Skybolt Missile
2N. Where R is 80 per cent, the
lead to major overruns and profit
which, according to Secretary Mc
10th unit, for example, is 80 per
drainage in commercial applica
Namara, rose in estimated total cost
cent of the cost of the 5th unit, and
tions of technical products. But
from $0.9 billion in early 1961 to
the cost curve is said to have a
these applications have no angel to
over $2.2 billion in mid-1962. Some
“slope” of 80 per cent. Such costs
subsidize overruns through egineer
times estimates are pessimistic and
plot as a straight line on log-log
ing changes or cost reimbursement
paper. Among other contributions,
increase the cost base on which
contracts. The project must stand
profits are calculated under certain
learning curve analysis permits rea
on its own feet—such a change is
types of contracts.
sonably accurate prediction of the
not easy to create in the large group
It is not unusual for manage
effect of engineering changes on
of specialized functions, each with
production costs. No other tech
ments to justify their underestima
its own bureaucratic momentum,
tion of a new technical program by
nique does this. It,
is a tool
which comprise the technical prod
their intention—and ability—to con
created to master the effects of
company.
time-compression.
fuse issues and auditors sufficiently
But despite the demonstrated
to obtain the necessary further
power and indispensability of the
funds, and similar techniques can
Learning curve analysis
learning curve idea to technical
support overestimating. But these
Learning curve analysis affects
products estimating, even the aero
practices affect corporate, pro
scheduling and facilities utilization
fessional, and personal integrity
space companies have known se
equally as much as labor costs. The
rious difficulty in using it. We are
and therefore have lasting effects.
rapid
drop of unit cost has an in
Such compromise eventually short
familiar with the enormous losses
verse
effect on unit output when
reported by all U. S. manufacturers
changes the technical products in
manpower
is constant. This effect is
after introduction of jet-powered
dustry in getting the full value of
like
that
experienced
by the Sorcer
equipment, which far exceeded the
its unique contributions.
er
’
s
Apprentice,
unable
to contain
effects of lower than anticipated
the
multiplication
of
effects
which
sales volume and the technical revi
Estimating direct labor
he
himself
set
motion.
At
some
sions necessary in some cases; and
point
it
is
necessary
to
program
Estimating production labor costs
many military aerospace projects
major manpower reductions if pro
for these companies is also an un
suffered major overruns. There is
duction is to be held within com
usual problem. New processes and
evidence that many such overruns
pany
financial limits and customer
materials require new make-buy de
occurred through failure to recog
requirements;
in
major rear
cisions, which introduce major ele
nize the existence of an “S-Curve”
rangements
of
production
lines and
ments of uncertainty. The costs of
pattern in early production, affect
crew
assignments
must
occur
if eco
completely new items themselves,
ing the first 100 units or so. Study
even with a freeze on the original
nomic
operation
is
to
continue.
of this pattern indicates that costs
Careful definition of such require
design, are always difficult to esti
of the first 250 units can be over
mate accurately. But the fact that
ments
essential to estimating and
one-third above that projected by
production
scheduling, to which
designs employ “state-of-the-art”
the ordinary straight-line learning
learning-curve
techniques add a
concepts also means that engineer
curve. Other shortcomings in use of
ing changes will be introduced
whole
new
dimension.
the learning curve have occurred
long after production begins, with
Use of this advanced technique in
through failure to measure the fac
substantial effects on the level
estimating
manufacturing labor is
tors controlling the “slope,” to iden
predictability of costs.
certainly
weakened
by the account
tify clearly the unit for which
Once more the technical prod
ing
practices
of
technical
products
learning occurs, and to measure the
ucts companies—again the aircraft
companies.
Most
confuse
the very
effect of lead times on the degree to
manufacturers—have developed
definition
of
direct
labor
by
includ
which the S-Curve will exceed
wholly new techniques for estimat
ing
overhead
personnel
such
as in
the ordinary straight-line learning
ing direct labor costs and man
spection,
engineering,
liaison,
ma
curve.3
power. The technique revolves
terials
handling,
and
shop
clerical
The tendency of some manage
around the “learning curve” idea,
personnel. This prevents clear-cut
ments to estimate programs loosely,
a fundamental pattern most ap
measurement of direct labor tasks
discussed in relation to R&D esti
propriate to products produced in
and efficiency, since nothing similar
to the industrial engineering stand
low volumes (under 5,000 units)
3For further discussion, see “New Con
but having high unit labor content.
ards for production personnel exists
cepts of the Learning Curve by the
Its basic characteristic is described
for
these functions. It therefore con
author, Journal of Industrial Engineering,
conventionally as follows: if unit N
fuses the estimating process and afJuly 1960.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtservices/vol1/iss1/9
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Primitive accounting practices in technical products companies . . .
fects its accuracy, while unneces
sary costs occur through the protec
tion of these personnel by the halo
of direct labor classification.
It is common to hear criticism of
learning-curve techniques by com
mercial manufacturing personnel,
who feel that the strong pattern of
labor cost reduction for technical
products simply indicates gross in
efficiency in the early stages. Their
criticism gains credence from the
cost
less
sales in which such

ous instances
ment
run
ditio
is
partly the case. But as a broad
evaluation it reflects misunder
standing of the circumstances sur
rounding introduction of complex
state-of-the-art products. Estimat
ing this process—and managing it
later—requires understanding of
whole new dimensions of cost and
schedule analysis, and recognition
of that dimension is a fundamental
contribution by the aircraft indus
try. Its further development and ap
plication to electronics and other
technical industries is inevitable,
although proceeding more slowly
than need be.

Fabrication estimates poor
Commercial industrial engineers
do properly criticize estimating of
fabrication activities. Technical pro
ducts companies in general, and
aerospace in particular, have grown
up with a considerable disrespect
for close control of these costs.
This has occurred because develop
and assembly costs are pre
dominant early in the program, be
cause lot sizes rarely reach longproportions, and because the
large number of machines and the
short runs complicate cost accum
mulation. But even fabrication
and personnel become more im
portant as product design is com
pleted and assembly proceeds
rapidly down the learning curve.
Eventually fabrication—which fol
lows a much
rapid rate of cost
reduction—becomes a large propor

Published by eGrove, 1964
38

tion of current cost: how large will
depend on the total number of units
produced. Commercial manufac
turers have solved problems of
accumulation and estimating for
complicated fabrication situations,
and techniques are available for
adapting these solutions to fabri
cation of technical products. Only
the will seems lacking.



Estimating overhead



The overhead cost of manufac
turing technical products runs even
higher than for commercial opera
tions. After adjusting for the pecu
liar accounting treatment in which
technical companies place some
overhead functions in direct labor,
manufacturing overhead may run
30 per cent of
or even more.
To this must be added sizable costs
of field service, engineering liaison,
and company-funded product im
provement costs amounting to an
other 10 per cent of sales.
Despite the size of these costs,
their part in the estimating proce
dure seems the weakest of any for
a technical products company. This
results from the poor definition and
measurement following from the
primitive accounting systems in ef
fect. It is not unusual, for example,
for a plant of five to ten thousand
men to be represented in estimating
and product pricing by two or three
burden centers; the corresponding
commercial practice might well in
volve ten or more. Under these con
mix separa
aren
ns there can be little
profit

are
tion of fixed and variable costs to
provide guidance in estimating new
programs, and, where sizable
changes occur in the
of pro
cesses or products, major errors 
inevitable.
Closely related is the lack of data
on utilization of equipment, a herit
age of the history of technical com
panies to whom much equipment
was furnished by the Government
at little or no charge. Furthermore,

the huge tooling costs required by
revolutionary products advances
may be thrown into overhead for
allocation to all products on the
basis of direct labor or similar
broad indexes, when not furnished
free by the Government and so
totally ignored in cost statements.
Either way generates gross distor
tion of current operating costs and
discourages accurate estimating.
As a result of such loose practice
we often observe a technical com
pany, entering new fields or fight
ing the inroads of competition, fail
ing to sell its services because of
unrealistic overhead rates. We hear
comments by its management that
such types of businesses “just
’t
profitable enough” to justify the
effort, or that the company’s “cost
of doing business is too high for
that product” and that its efforts
had better be spent in other direc
tions. Such conclusions may be un
justified, a fact which would be
realized if realistic accounting and
estimating practices were to show
true variable and cash product
costs. The costs themselves even
tually would drop as a result! And
of course there is the opposite cir
cumstance, where business is un
derbid with possible serious
dilution and unexpected working
capital needs.

Reasons for poor estimates
The situation exhibits such
  para
doxes as to cause wonder if there
aren’t deeper reasons for its exist
ence. There do appear to be such:
1. The primitive accounting prac
tices used permit manipulating
direct and indirect cost classifica
tions in estimating Government
business. In such business direct
cost bears an aura of respectability,
in contrast to overhead cost. Rais
ing the amount of direct classifica
tion lowers the apparent overhead
rate, which is a habitual issue with

7

Management Services: A Magazine of Planning, Systems, and Controls, Vol. 1 [1964], No. 1, Art. 9

handicap the estimating procedure
Government buying agencies de
spite the lack of comparability be
tween companies and lack of corre
lation with total cost.
2. Low apparent overhead
ease justification of overruns, since
a large portion can be plausibly at
tributed to a simple following of
direct
by indirect. This objec
tive is directly related to the ten
dency to underestimate a program
to get the business, with confi
dence that subsequent engineering
changes can obtain full cost re
covery.
3. The lack of detailed informa
tion on overhead costs dulls
sharpness of outside questions re
garding internal operating effici
ency. It also cuts the embarrassment
to which internal departments
subjected by the management itself.

Protection through confusion
We have here a tendency of
large bureaucracy to hide its short
comings with a cloud of confusion.
The tendency is powerful, as shown
by the persistent weakness of over
head estimating and resistance to
installation of elementary controls
on overhead. Unfortunately, there
is a reverse effect: in confusing
their opponents in this game, man
agement confuses itself
and—
worse yet—trains subordinates in
miserable habits. It has only itself
to blame for the serious effects on
the estimating procedure, and on
the inability to meet estimates once
a job is sold.
There are those apologists who
suggest that the practices discussed
could not have had the serious ef
fects outlined here—for don’t we
have a competitive system which
weeds out inefficient
And haven’t many technical pro
ducts companies survived and
flourished? This is true in the long
run. But in the short run they are
often protected from close com
petition, with its cleansing effect on

estimates and control procedures.
For their products are rarely di
rectly comparable, and price has
been less of a factor than delivery
and technical performance. In 1961,
for example, only one-third of all
defense contracts were competi
tively bid. This has played an im
portant part in permitting the man
agements of technical companies
to avoid upgrading their estimating
and control practices to the level
reached by commercial companies.

Pricing
The pricing decision, once basic
program estimates have been made,
tends to be a simple application of
G&A rates and a “markup” for
profit. In contrast to the commercial
products company, there is rarely
a specific analysis of the relation
of price to the size of the market.
Rather than a two-valued decision,
an oversimplified decision is made
on a single price, and it is as
sumed that a single market quantity
will be the result if the business is
gotten at all. This is simply one
more hangover from past days of
defense business.
There is relatively little feedback
of marketing and investment fac
tors. The marketing function is
mainly involved in product intelli
gence, with its frequent associate,
the Contracts Department, han
dling superficial details of co
ordination, preparation, and sub
mission of the estimates developed.
While product design and technical
superiority often do create the mar
ket, the time has long since come
when several sophisticated products
may be available to meet one major
Therefore, price elasticity,
promotional effort, and field sup
port are essential to guessing the
ultimate buying decision.
In summary, a much simpler esti
mating process exists for the techni
cal products company than for the
commercial manufacturer. Tabula-
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Many technical products
companies have survived
and flourished . . . but
most of them have been
protected from normal
competitive pressures.
Their products are often
unique; thus price has been
less of a factor in
acceptance than production
reliability and product
performance. The result:
there has been compara
tively little pressure on
management to upgrade
estimating and control
practices to the level
common in commercial
companies.
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Total

Marketing

Engg

Mfg.

Finance

1
3
2

—

—

5
—

—
—
5
—

6

7

5

Design
Schedule
Cost
Price

1

—

12
2

—
2

Total

22

Figure 2

tion of duties and advisory rela
tionships from the flow chart ap
pear in Figure 2 above.
The technical company takes
only about
half as many steps as
same
does the commercial company. Of
equal significance, Marketing and
Finance account for two-fifths of
the total, compared with almost
two-thirds for the commercial oper
ation. Despite
major contribu
tions to the estimating art, the
technical products company pro
cedure has serious shortcomings.

A redefinition of estimating
Now let’s draw some conclusions
from the examples which we have
just discussed at length.
The procedures followed by the
two companies are complementary
in strengths and weaknesses. The
commercial company is strong in
its marketing evaluation and in con
trol of product design to market
considerations. It is accurate in
manufacturing costs and may make
sophisticated evaluation of final
price against market elasticity and
promotional and manufacturing
costs. Finance and Marketing play
a notable part in the entire pro
cedure, and the degree of feedback
generated by their participation is
indicated by the flow chart’s com
plexity. The commercial company
is weak in estimating development
cycles for major new products
the manufacturing costs when such
products are placed into production
and in the related scheduling tech
niques. In contrast, the technical
products company is strong in the
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latter but weak in the former areas.
Though it has made major contri
butions to the estimating art over
the past twenty-five years, it often
fails to reap the rewards as a result
of these weaknesses.
In a way these different areas
of strength and weakness are not
surprising. It is common for Ameri
can business to develop its pro
cedures and capabilities by simple
reaction to outside forces. Each of
these two industry groups reflects
different rates of technical progress,
marketing maturity, and competi
tive pressures, and most of the dif
ferences in their estimating can be
traced to one of these three sources.
Whatever the cause, the situation
means that neither type of com
pany normally can handle the
other’s estimating problem. This is
unfortunate, because many influ
ences drive each increasingly into
the other’s field of endeavor.

Trouble in commercial market
The years since World War II
are replete with efforts by aero
space firms to diversify into com
mercial fields: commercial aircraft,
appliances, aluminum boats, mobile
homes, industrial instruments, plas
tic foam for household use, or in
dustrial uses of military electronic
equipment. Success has been quite
erratic, mainly because commercial
production and marketing tech
niques differ sharply from
followed in defense applications,
even when design is similar. The
powerful demands on special man
agement skills can rarely be met in

time by the
organization.
The commercial manufacturer is
increasingly forced by competitive
pressure to undertake R&D and
ultimate production of products
much more sophisticated than
on which the business was built.
He is meeting surprising problems
in living with R&D schedules and
budgets, and persistent difficulty in
phasing the new item into produc
tion facilities and in controlling the
manpower required. Often the dis
may of the commercial manufactur
ing
at his failure to meet such
plans is exceeded only by the em
barrassment of the treasurer.

Common areas of weakness
In addition to these complemen
tary weaknesses, however, both
types of industry are weak in other
areas. For example, both companies
approach estimating mainly as a
matter of cost analysis. This is well
illustrated by the fact that in the
tabular summaries of each com
pany’s estimating procedure,
considerations amounted to 60 per
cent of the total for the commer
cial manufacturer, and 55 per cent
for the technical products company.
Despite extensive marketing orien
tation by the commercial company
and R&D programing by the tech
nical company, hassles over costs
dominate the estimating procedure
and tend to take over the final top
decision.
Furthermore, both companies
weak in determining the full effect
of a program upon total company
operations — what is sometimes
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What should estimating try to accomplish? What is its real purpose?
called “program integration.” The
tendency is strong to make only
rough checks of a program’s impact
on facilities, organization, person
nel, and return on investment; lack
of a firm decision to proceed seems
to deter all but a few companies
from working out the full implica
tions of a proposal.
There is also a general failure to
determine all elements of invest
ment required in a proposed pro
gram—particularly working capital
investment. It has been amply
demonstrated that working capital
(accounts receivable, inventories,
etc.) requirements are fully as im
portant as fixed assets and tooling
in evaluating the rate of return for
a major change in operations.4
Such weaknesses can be fatal,
and estimating procedures and
tools must be improved. With the
wealth of experience and insight
generated by the two major facets
of our industrial economy discussed
above, we should be able to arrive
at guidelines for the benefit of
both, with application to other sec
tors as well. No system will abolish
problems. But a broader view of
the estimating process will give a
better chance to avoid major blun
ders.
So we are led to re-examine the
purpose of the entire estimating
activity. What should it aim at if
we are to avoid the frustrations and
pitfalls of existing practice? And
how can we reach that goal?
Stripped to its bare bones, the
real purpose of an estimate is to
help top management define a pro
posed action clearly, so that it can:
• Evaluate the consequences for
the entire enterprise,
• Decide what to do about it,

• Control the results.

4See “The Special Importance of the
Make or Buy Decision,” by E. B. Coch
ran in “Modem Approaches to Produc
tion Planning and Control.” American
Management Association, 1960.

To do this job, estimating must
be viewed as an exercise in simula
tion. It is actually a model-building
task to explore the realistic impact
of a new program on future com
pany operations. The three steps
listed constitute an important test
of the adequacy of an estimate. If
any one of them cannot be taken
for a given estimate, that estimate
will be identified as likely to pro
duce major error, internal contro
versy, and top-level uneasiness.
From these steps flow several pre
tions for theinstrument.
broad outlines

and specific content of a sound esti
suppor
mate.

Program definition
The estimate must provide a
complete picture of the project in
volved, be a complete plan of steps
involved, and only incidentally a
cost statement.
It simply is not enough to buy
off on an estimate by saying, “We
did it before at $50 per pound and
we can do it now for 5 per cent
more (or less).” The seat of the
pants is a blunt
We
must replace this kind of thinking
with specifics. How will the job be
done? Is there time, floor space,
equipment, trained people, vendor
decisions,

t?
cost are
For technical product companies
this requires closer measurement of
sales potential and price-volume re
lationships, proper appraisal of
overhead costs, more internal feed

back of data and
up
grading of estimating integrity.
Commercial companies must pay
closer attention to definition and
phasing of R&D with production
activities and to the new dimensions
of cost phenomena when radical
ly new products are produced. They
must also be willing to explore net
work scheduling and advanced
techniques of
analysis which
beginning to permit unheard-of
precision in minimizing flow times
and optimizing cost-time relation
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ships. The sophisticated analysis
developed by technically oriented
companies can contribute greatly to
the profits of commercial com
panies; the main hurdle is in the
minds of the managements in
volved.
For both types of companies, it
is essential to make complete evalu
ation of capital requirements. Even
working capital needs can cut the
return from a new program to an
intolerably low level by raising
total investment as much as 75 per
cent through sharp differences in
the flow time of inventory, the col
lection period from customers, and
terms available from suppliers.
Having clearly defined the pro
posed course of action, we must
then measure its effects on the total
enterprise. Many areas of opera
tions and basic strategy must be
covered by integration schedules,
which interweave the new project
with all other major plans and de
cisions by the company’s manage
ment. In particular such areas as
the following should be carefully
worked out:

Sales and operating profit
Penetration of the company’s
total market
Financing needs
Facility utilization
Manpower needs, utilization, and
sources
Overhead
Organization structure
Breakeven point
Return on investment
Certainly top management can
not be expected to make a proper
decision on anything less than the
foregoing.

Program control
Last but by no means least, the
estimate must provide a sound basis
for control of the project. If it
doesn’t do this, none of the fore
going is enforceable, and neither
top management nor anyone else
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can really afford to take the entire
procedure as anything but an in
teresting exercise. No plan is worth
while unless it contains within itself
the levers by which control may
be exercised.
To permit control the estimate
must first be comprehensive: that
is, it should cover all areas of per
formance bearing on accomplish
ment of the program. Any check
point usable by management in
evaluating routine operating per
formance is a candidate for inclu
sion: the ratio of market penetra
tion and its trends; the detailed
milestones contained in a master
plan of development and engineer
ing tests; dates of facility and tool
ing completions; procurement of
long lead-time components; dates
of first unit production and of spe
cified rates of output and shipment;
the organization structure of key
positions; detailed budgets on man
power and
of direct labor and
material; important variable over
head costs; inventory required by
type, location, and point in time.
A final broad financial summary
merely reduces accomplishment in
all these areas to (deceptively)
simple projections of sales, profit,
investment, and return, and is itself
a useful control document only
when properly supported by such
operating data.

Efficient performance assured
It is wise to base all estimates on
efficient performance, which there
should be a fifty-fifty chance of
reaching at any given time. This
provides a reasonably consistent
basis for control reporting through
out the company, and permits man
agement itself to provide the neces
sary safety factors all in one de
cision, avoiding the pyramiding of
safety factors so often found.
Of course, there are further re
quirements of control. Performance
must be defined by responsibility
area, since that is the only means
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by which corrective action can be
taken. Care must be taken to plan
commitments, since this permits
control to be exercised over certain
large items before the horse
out
of the bam. Data shown in the plan
must be compatible with the report
ing system, since that system is
the major
by which the need
for corrective action will be defined
—this will require changes in most
reporting systems as often as it will
restrict the plans format.
If the plan isn’t easily control
lable, then it is of doubtful validity.
That generally means that it has
not been thought through. It is
worth repeating that cost overruns
reflect poor planning and control
after the job is sold as often as they
do bad estimating per se. If the
timate
’t contain such plan
ning before the decision is taken,
not only are the projections less
likely to be correct but the ten
dency is almost irresistible to for
get about making the detailed plans
after the job is obtained.

Effect on estimating organization
We have seen that estimating
should involve complete
of a program and of its effects on
all company operations. It follows
that it must be separate from the
operating functions of engineering,
manufacturing, and marketing.
Therefore it must report either di
rectly to top management, or
through a top-level staff function
which does. It can also be con
cluded that since a large portion of
the task pertains to profit analysis
and investment in facilities and
working capital, the estimating
function must have prompt
to key financial data and be capable
of evaluating it. Let us now con
sider what these requirements en
tail for organization placement of
the estimating function.
One possibility—with consider
able attractiveness—
that of a
separate programing office report

ing directly to top management.
Such a function may well have not
only the estimating responsibility
but also certain closely related
planning functions such as market
analysis, sales forecasting, and facil
ities evaluation. This is sometimes
done by the aerospace industry,
and it works quite well where other
staff departments are not qualified
to handle the forward planning
and complex co-ordination always
involved in preparation of large
estimates.

Finance should be responsible
However, serious conflict and
duplication can result when the
analysis functions involved in es
timating costs are separated from
the financial department. Finance
reports the cost and other statistics
essential to all departments, and has
long been considered mainly a data
processing service. But because of
its relatively objective position, its
placement astride the lines of com
munication, and the increasing im
portance of advanced management
control techniques, Finance is be
ing given far-reaching responsi
bility for evaluation of company
performance and of related plans.5
This is also inherently economical,
since operating results and plans
must be anlyzed simply for Finance
to select significant areas, condense
the relevant data to save manage
ment time, and make reports real
istic and accurate. As the financial
function increasingly
as a
broad planning and control func
tion, its responsibility for data ac
cumulation and audit is progres
sively overshadowed by its analyti
cal activity. The referenced discus
sion gives further reasons why this
should have occurred. Where it has,
the creation of a separate program
ing office will dilute planning and
control functions through conflict
5See “What is a Controller,” E. B.
Cochran, The Journal of Accountancy,
July 1955.
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Estimating is too often handled as an exercise in cost analysis . . .
of interest and duplication of func
tions with Finance.
There is another possibility, with
considerable utility in
situa
tions and strong adherents in many

companies. That
to establish
program managers reporting to top
management. This actually a var
iant of the first approach, but it
carries the further assignment of
line co-ordination responsibilities
once the program becomes acti
vated. It has the advantage not
only of focusing attention on all
phases of a new product program
in the estimating phase, but of ap
plying the same emphasis to actual
operations. This achieves a unity
of approach in both planning and
operations, comparable to that oc
curring if the program were set up
as a separate operating division,
which may actually be the final re
sult.
The approach is often used by
the aerospace industry and in mer
chandising organizations where em
phasis on marketing considerations
is so intense that the marketing
product manager is granted a wide
scope of authority.

Objectivity is compromised
However, in a manufacturing
and engineering environment, this
solution has many drawbacks in
addition to those mentioned above.
First, the objectivity of the planning
process itself is seriously compro
mised by the interest which the
product manager has in generating
a favorable decision on his pro
posal. This necessitates a thorough
evaluation of details by an outside
group, generating unavoidable du
plication. Second, it encourages em
pire building, as more facets of
each company function are sought
by the product manager, once the
project is operational. Third, new
product line assignments generate
major controversy, while frequent
shifts due to rapidly moving tech
nology stimulate maneuvering by

candidates to acquire prize assign
ments, extend their “empire” or
widen their scope of authority.

A third possibility
The third major possibility is that
of a strong estimating group in the
analytical area of the financial de
partment. This solution meets the
main objections to the first two,
and can be a good one. But it has
its own trap: it cannot be effective
when the estimating group is pri
marily staffed with accountants. Es
timating, as is true for many
of analytical work, requires a par
ticular combination of industrial
engineering, financial, and market
ing talent if proper feedback and
planning are to be the result. Such
personnel have been rare in the
past, and the emphasis on speciali
zation necessary to so much of the
financial profession has generally
meant an increasing inability to
grapple with the broad problems of
estimating.
However, as the arts of program
planning and
planning them
selves have become wider spread,
and the breadth of graduate busi
ness education has increased, the
supply of personnel trained in such
work has improved. But if a choice
must be made, it is better to estab
lish a separate planning function at
first—then transfer it to Finance—
than to place the function in Fi
nance when adequate personnel
not available.

Concept too narrow
To summarize: Estimating is too
often handled as an exercise in cost
analysis. This leads to what is
euphemistically called “poor com
munications” between management
and the estimating profession. But
such phraseology simply papers
over the real problem. The heart
of the matter is the narrow concept
of estimating held by many prac
titioners—from the professionals
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themselves to the executives to
whom they report and who rightly
criticize the inadequate results.
A review of estimating practices
illustrates this thesis. Taking two
widely different major areas of
manufacturing, we saw that each is
strong in certain areas but weak in
others, reflecting their
Both emphasize cost too much, and
so make major decisions without
essential facts. Naturally, this
creates major errors in cost projec
tion.

Estimating is planning
Against this backdrop, we are led
to view the estimating process as
comprehensive planning, requiring
extensive feedback between partici
pants at all states of preparation.
Reduced to its essentials, an esti
mate is actually a major step in
company planning. Therefore it
must be:

1. A realistic master plan for
product development, testing, phase
into production, and
2. Inclusive of working capital
and facilities requirements.

3. Integrated with other com
pany plans on the basis of their
probable success.
4. Evaluated against total com
pany objectives for market position,
sales volume, profit,
invest
ment.

5. A sound basis for operating
controls.
It is therefore suggested that an
estimate should be considered an
exercise in simulation: a model of
company organization and opera
tions under the new conditions
posed by the program under review.
This concept has real consequences
for the organization responsibility
of estimating and for the type of
personnel who handle it. And with
out proper implementation there,
achievement of the goals developed
is impossible.
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